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VALUE ADDED TAX VERSUS BROADER
INCOME BASE: TAX REFORM FOR
THE RICH OR THE NOT
SO RICH*
Charles I. Kingsont
I could easily add $50-billion to the base through tax reforms....
Joseph Pechman, explaining how Sen-
ator McGovern's negative income tax
proposal (later abandoned) might be
financed.1
Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man; But will they come
when you do call them?
Shakespeare2
Our tax structure rests ultimately on belief in its fairness. The
revelation that six hundred millonaires had avoided paying any federal
income tax led Joseph Barr, then Undersecretary of the Treasury, to
warn of a "taxpayers' revolt,"' and prompted the Tax Reform Act of
1969.4 Similar indignation followed disclosures that the former French
premier 5 and Governor Ronald Reagan 6 had avoided paying the income
tax imposed by their own jurisdictions. To most people, fairness means
progressive taxation-the richer you are, the greater your proportionate
obligation to contribute to the public benefit.
In theory, then, progressive taxation should be politically popular;
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Joseph W. Jacobs for his assistance
in the preparation of this article.
- Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1959, LL.B. 1963, Harvard University.
I N.Y. Times, June 28, 1972, at 65, col. 2.
2 Henry IV, Part I, act III, scene 1.
3 NEwswEEK, Jan. 27, 1969, at 79.
4 Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited to respective sections of the Internal Revenue Code].
Stimulation of legislative action by public disclosure is not a new phenomenon. The
present provisions taxing personal holding companies can be traced to the early years
of the Depression, when-at a time when the financial community was calling for a
spirit of sacrifice--it was discovered that people such as E.W. Scripps, Andrew Mellon,
and Cecil B. DeMille were legally using such companies to escape individual tax on sub-
stantial income from stock investments. See P. STaM, THE GREAT TaRaSuRY RAm 131-37
(1962).
5 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1972, at 14, col. 5.
6 See id., May 5, 1971, at 53, col. 3.
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in practice, the embodiment of progressivity in an income tax is any-
thing but. First, the income tax is highly visible: a paycheck shows how
much extra cash an employee would have if income tax did not have to
be withheld,7 and the necessity of filing a return reminds everyone of
exactly how much he had to pay. Second, the unrealistically high rates
of tax (ranging up to ninety-one percent just a few years ago) in some
cases-for example, athletes or overnight movie stars-turns progressiv-
ity into near confiscation. Third, the nominal progression indicated by
the rates is illusory-as shown by the six hundred millionaires. The
Nixon Administration recommended the recently completed study of
a value-added tax (VAT),8 which would suffer none of those drawbacks:
first, it would be included in the price of goods; second, its rate would
be perhaps three percent; and third, it would apply uniformly, except
-as indicated by HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson-for rebates to
families with income of less than, say, $12,000. 9
If, however, the value-added tax is to raise an estimated $13 to
$16 billion of revenue,'0 some of us will have to pay something. This
article attempts to suggest who will, and-with reference to several re-
cent proposed changes in the income tax law-who should.
7 A California proprietor used to give his employees their gross salary in cash. They
then filed past tables and handed over the various withholding taxes.
8 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1972, at 12, col. 3.
VAT is a tax imposed at each stage of the production process on the value added
by the producer. To illustrate, assume the following transactions:
1. Farmer sells wheat to the miller for $1.00.
2. Miller sells flour to the baker for $2.00.
3. Baker sells bread to the grocer for $3.00.
4. Grocer sells bread to the housewife for $4.00.
If the VAT rate were 5%, the farmer would collect $.05 of tax from the miller. The
miller in turn would collect $.10 from the baker; but owing to credit for the $.05 he
paid to the farmer, he would pay over to the government only S.05. This represents the
5% tax rate as applied to the difference between the cost of his purchase and his gross
sales-that is, the value added by him. The baker in turn would collect $.15 from the
grocer, and the grocer, $.20 from the housewife. In the above sequence, the credit al-
lowed to those purchasing for resale has two effects. First, the VAT must be separately
stated to everyone except the housewife; she needs no records since she receives no
refund. Second, if the housewife is willing to buy the bread for $4.20, she has borne the
entire tax.
Other types of VAT would allow credits, with respect to capital equipment pur-
chases, only to the extent of depreciation, if at all. See Oakland, The Theory of the
Value-Added Tax: I, A Comparison of Tax Bases, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 119, 122 (1967). See also,
Oakland, The Theory of the Value-Added Tax: II, Incidence Effects, id. at 270. The type
of VAT described, however, is that most likely to be considered for the United States. See
Surrey, Value-Added Tax: The Case Against, 48 HAiv. Bus. Rxv., Nov.-Dec. 1970, at 86,
87-88.





Initially, let me explain some realities with which the enemies of
progressive taxation are generally familiar.
A. Revenue
Progressive taxation cannot be justified solely on the basis of a
need for revenue. Since the very rich constitute a small minority, the
bulk of revenue must be raised from the middle and lower-middle in-
come classes.' 1 Thus, to the people for whom progressive taxation is
most painful-and who by their political influence are most able to
undermine it-its justification must rely on egalitarian ideas rather
than practical needs.
B. Progressivity
Progressive taxation does not just mean that the rich pay more
taxes than the poor, but that they pay proportionately more taxes. For
example, a flat ten percent income tax rate means that a person with
$10,000 of income pays one-tenth as much tax as a man with $100,000 of
income; but that does not mean that the tax is progressive. The fed-
eral income tax rates indicate that we expect the $10,000 man to pay a
twenty-two percent tax on his next dollar of income, whereas the
$100,000 man will pay sixty percent. The proponents of VAT claim
that rebates of tax to the poor will insure against its being regressive. 2
Even to debate in such terms accepts a basic and far-reaching attack
on our idea of tax equity; we are asked to believe that a tax is accept-
able so long as middle-income people do not pay proportionately more
than the rich.'3
11 To illustrate, in 1969 the Treasury estimated that an increase in everyone's
personal exemption from $600 to $1,000 would result in a $12.7 billion revenue loss. 115
CoNG. REc. 35,487 (1969) (statement of Senator Long).
12 That man is poor who consumes all of his earnings. Rich is the man who
consumes only a fraction. In Italy, for no clear reason, consumer goods are taxed
to the last cent. But the income tax is a real joke.
I have been told that the economics textbooks call this system of taxation
"painless." Painless means that the rich manage to have the poor pay the taxes
without the poor noticing it.
TH ScHooLBoYs OF BARIANA, LmTrER TO A TEAcHE 62 (N. 2Rossi & T. Cole transi.
1970), quoted in Gordon, Taxation of the Poor and the Normative Theory of Tax Inci-
deuce, Am. EcoN. Rxv., May 1972, at 319.
13 This idea was neatly summarized by Anatole France, who wrote that the law




A decision to impose VAT-the equivalent of a national sales tax
-rather than to increase federal income tax collections reflects the
popular attitude that if you don't see it, it doesn't cost anything. State
legislatures, presented with a similar choice, almost always choose the
less-resented sales tax. Public opinion forced Connecticut to repeal its
income tax.14 New York City was willing to extend a sales tax of seven
percent to meals costing less than a dollar-the "hot dog tax."' 5 Shortly
thereafter, the newspapers reported that about one-half the federal
employees in the city failed to pay the city income tax.16 Thus, people
who did not publicly demonstrate against a sales tax were willing to
commit a crime rather than pay income tax. In New Jersey, Governor
Cahill's progressive income tax was badly defeated.17 In New Hamp-
shire, opposition to a state income tax is so entrenched that as a candi-
date in the 1972 presidential primary Representative Wilbur Mills,
departing from the prepared text of his speech, retreated from his sup-
port of such a tax as a condition for revenue sharing.'8 Had the tax on
tea been sufficiently indirect, Massachusetts might still be a British
colony.
The regressiveness of state sales taxes can be seen in the optional
tables attached to the 1972 federal income tax forms. Those tables in-
dicate that for each $1,000 of additional income, two percent of the
sales tax considered paid by a family with a $20,000 income must be
added. Thus, a family having $40,000 of income-double that amount
-is estimated to pay only two-fifths more sales tax. And state sales
taxes are even more regressive than VAT, since they are deductible
from federal taxable income. After giving effect to such deduction,
state sales tax costs the $40,000 family only thirteen percent more than
it does the $20,000 family.'9
Local property taxes also fall more heavily on the poor.20 But the
personal attention of an individualized assessment, together with the
14 See generally N.Y. Times, July 9, 1971, at 1, col. 1; id., July 25, 1971, at 1, col.
7; id., Aug. 24, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
15 Id., June 23, 1971, at 49, col. 2.
16 Id., Dec. 20, 1971, at 26, col. 4.
17 Id., July 18, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
18 Id., Feb. 16, 1972, at 20, col. 2.
19 For married taxpayers, a deduction from $40,000 of income saves 45% of the
state tax; from $20,000 of income, 32%. The net cost of $100 sales tax to a $20,000
family is $68; of $140 of tax to a $40,000 family, $77.
20 The Governor's Tax Policy Committee in New Jersey recently reported that
residents earning less than $5,000 pay five times the effective property tax rate of those
with an income of $25,000 or more. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1972, § 4, at 7, col. 2.
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necessity for making out a large check, makes the act of giving pain-
fully clear to the taxpayer. Suburbanites, rich and poor alike, resent the
crushing property tax burden. In contrast, city tenants-who protest
most other taxes-generally suffer property tax increases in silence.
Ironically, such taxes hurt them more than suburban homeowners, since
the property taxes they pay-in the form of increased rent-do not re-
duce their income taxes.. The reason must be that since the monthly
check is paid to the landlord, he, rather than the city, is blamed for any
rent hike.
Perhaps the best examples of painless taxation are Off-Track Bet-
ting and state lotteries.21 Whether such state-sponsored gambling bene-
ficially diverts funds of low-income people from bookies to public uses
is beyond the scope of this article. The point is that there is little op-
position to such regressive taxes from those who pay them.
In terms of invisibility, then, nongambling taxes can be ranked
as follows: a sales tax has the lowest profile; local property taxes en-
counter strong resistance from homeowners, less from tenants; and
everyone hates an income tax. Unfortunately, the ranking of these
taxes also reflects their regressiveness. A sales tax falls on everyone, but
less on those who can afford to save; a real property tax is imposed in
proportion to the value of one's residence, but on the basis of gross
value rather than unmortgaged ownership, and with an income tax
disadvantage to those who cannot afford to be homeowners; and an
income tax is imposed on the basis of income. The political appeal of
the Nixon Administration's suggestion that VAT would reduce local
property taxes was that the former is more palatable, whereas abating
property taxes by increasing income tax rates would raise the same
opposition at the federal level that it did in New Jersey.22 Moreover,
21 In comparing such devices with taxes, one observer noted:
The government takes the same amount of money from its citizens in both
cases, though not necessarily from the same citizens. By running a lottery it
avoids certain unwanted consequences: people escape from heavy taxation by
moving away or they counterattack by throwing a government which imposes
new taxes out of office. A lottery . . . has neither of these effects. The only op-
position comes from those . . . who are themselves seldom gamblers.
B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNrrY 38 (1971).
New Hampshire has perfected this quasi-taxing device to a fine art. The state raises
a significant portion of its funds from gambling activities. Not only does that revenue
come primarily from the poor, but in large part from the poor in Massachusetts and
from tourists who visit New Hampshire to avoid the sales and excise taxes of other
states. Although the state ranks low in services provided for its residents, they have
vigorously resisted both an income and sales tax. The state's most influential newspaper,
the Manchester Union-Leader, opposes both taxes. Its publisher, William Loeb, lives in
Massachusetts.
22 Ironically, the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations recommended
[Vol. 58:340
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VAT would be even less visible than a state sales tax, since it would be
included in the price of goods. Thus, just as the tenant blames his
landlord for passing on property taxes in the form of increased rent,
the consumer would be likely to attribute higher VAT prices to the
retailer.
D. Bookkeeping and Good Causes
Controversial and unpopular budget appropriations are often fi-
nanced out of general tax revenues; no one would propose a napalm
tax. Conversely, a specific regressive tax measure when linked to a
popular cause can gain wide support, as in the case of the social secu-
rity tax. Insistence that payments to the elderly appear to be the re-
turn of their own contributions permits one of the larger federal
expenditures to be financed in great part by tax on only the first $10,800
of income.23 Although the recent increase in payroll taxes should collect
more revenue than would VAT, its connection with increased social se-
curity benefits, which are felt to benefit the taxpayer or his family, al-
lowed it to pass without significant opposition from either tax reformers
or the general public.2 4 However, since this money ultimately represents
a claim on the federal government, the idea of funds in one or another
government trust means nothing more than a choice between marks in
a ledger.
2 5
against using VAT to reduce the property tax not on grounds of tax equity, but primarily
on the theory that any federal financing of local education would carry with it the
possibility of federal control. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
23 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3121(a)(1), as amended, 85 Stat. 5 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as CODE].
24 An exception was a letter to the New York Times by Pechman, Rivlin, Schultze,
and Teeters, among others, dated September 28, 1972. The letter pointed out that the
proposed increase in the social security tax (later enacted) would extend its rapid growth
from 12.6% of federal revenues in 1963 to 25% in 1973; that between 1965 and 1971
payroll taxes exceeded payment to beneficiaries by $13 billion; and that the effective
payroll tax on a worker earning $9,000 or less in 1972 is 10.4%, but on a person earning
$50,000 is 1.9%. These percentages, however, reflected a stated premise that workers also
bear the one-half of the tax collected from employers. The writers suggested that one
effective method of reform would be to limit the payroll tax to pooled family earnings
in excess of personal exemptions and a low income allowance, which amounts to
$4,300 for a family of four. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1972, at 46, col. 3.
25 The unreality of allocations is shown by the Revenue Act of 1971 (Pub. L. No.
92-178, 85 Stat. 497 [hereinafter cited to respective sections of the Internal Revenue
Code]), which repealed the federal excise tax on cars. In order to provide a mechanism
for continuing the present pace of highway construction rather than having to justify
expenditures from general revenues, the Act allocated revenues from the alcohol tax
to highway construction funds. Logically, such an allocation must rest on the assump-
tion that people on the road are mostly drinkers.





The strongest argument for VAT is its potential as a politically
acceptable way of increasing federal revenues.26 A three percent VAT
could raise perhaps $18 billion, of which $3 to $5 billion would be
refunded to taxpayers with incomes of less than $12,000. Opponents
of VAT, however, feel not only that such a tax would impose a dis-
proportionate burden on low- and middle-income groups, but also that
these people already pay too great a share of total taxes. To remedy
this, the income and corporate tax base would be broadened by re-
ducing or eliminating tax preferences-those credits, deductions, and
exclusions which do not reflect "costs incurred in the process of pro-
ducing or earning" the taxpayer's income.
27
Amazingly, however, each side has publicly adopted the other's
strongest argument-VAT is promoted in the name of fairness, and
a broader income base is suggested as a fundraiser. Speaking for the
Nixon Administration, John Ehrlichman has indicated that VAT would
be used not as a revenue measure, but as a substitute for "unfair and
regressive" state and local property taxes.28 To urge VAT as a relief
from regressive taxation is political chutzpah. First, the trend of recent
court decisions is to decrease the proportionate property tax burden
taxes, the U.S.S.R. finances public expenditures-as the employer-by limiting the salaries
of its citizens. This amounts to an invisible withholding tax. But its claim that emigrants
should repay to the state the cost of their schooling (why not of their garbage collections?)
in the form of a departure tax graduated according to degrees earned, assumes that the
cost of education is borne by one of the following: (1) the people who stay; (2) the unedu-
cated, which amounts to regressive taxation; or (3) no one. That allocation would not fool
a 50-year-old New Jersey homeowner, who knows that his taxes have financed someone's
education.
26 VAT has been defended as the "least bad" tax for this purpose. See Smith, Value-
Added Tax: The Case For, 48 HAv. Bus. Rxv., Nov.-Dec. 1970, at 77. A Presidential Task
Force qualified its rejection of the tax by recommending that in the event of an unexpected
inadequacy in revenue "the Federal Government should turn to indirect taxation." PaRsi.
DENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINEss TAXATION, REPORT 70-71 (1970) [hereinafter cited as TAsx
FORCE REPORT]. The Task Force did not consider that the asserted VAT advantages of
administrative convenience, neutrality among types of business organizations, and export
competitiveness sufficiently warranted enacting it. Id. at 61-69.
27 Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Cor.
parison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705, 724 (1970).
28 N.Y. Times, May 26, 1972, at 1, col. 2. Ehrlichman was responding to a study by
the Brookings Institution which concluded that the government could not spend more
on social problems without a substantial tax increase. See C. Scnurz, E. Fmiua, A. RiLvN
& N. TELTERs, SErING NATIONAL PRiORrrIEs: THE 1973 BuDGETr 421-22 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as BRooaxNGs STuDY]. See also id. at 394-448.
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of lower-income communities. 9 Second, a tax on consumption, before
modification by exemptions for items such as food and medicine, may
well be borne in almost inverse proportion to the value of property
owned.80
Even with a rebate to persons whose incomes are below a certain
level, the tax continues to have several regressive features. Initially,
regressiveness begins above the last rebate level. Furthermore, since
VAT is not separately stated, nonrefundable local sales taxes would be
imposed on the increased price passed on to the consumer-a tax upon
a tax. Moreover, assuming a yearly rebate of $4 billion, the government
will have the equivalent of an annual $2 billion interest free loan.
The Revenue Act of 1971 enacted the asset depreciation range system
(ADR),81 which permits equipment to be depreciated at an artificially
fast rate for tax purposes. This grants business the interest free use of
about $2 billion. To use one bookkeeping method, therefore, VAT and
ADR taken together result in a semi-permanent $2 billion interest free
loan to business from the poor.32
Even assuming that a sales tax can be structured to be less regres-
sive than a property tax, to say that VAT substitutes for other taxes
rather than raises revenues is political bookkeeping. With VAT the
federal government will have, say, an extra $13 billion to spend. Its
use of a corresponding $13 billion to subsidize local public education
does not mean that VAT collections differ from other tax collections
reflected in the government budget, but only that the public will asso-
ciate the two.
Instead of emphasizing its fairness and progressiveness, however,
proponents of a broader income base have too often justified it by
asserting the need for more social spending. The case for a more
29 Recent court decisions, notably Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), and Robinson v. Cahill, 119 NJ. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972),
have mandated similar per-pupil educational expenditures on a statewide basis. In New
Jersey, for example, this will result in a lower percentage property tax assessment in
poorer communities and a higher percentage in rich ones. Use of the VAT to subsidize
local education could neutralize this step towards progressiveness.
80 According to fairly recent statistics, 2% of the population gets more than 40% of
the corporate dividends, but accounts for less than 6%0 of consumer expenditures. U.S.
BUREAU OF IABOR STATiStiCS, SURWEY OF CONsuMER ExPNDrrumR: 1960-61, at 27 (1966).
31 CODE § 167(m), as amended, 85 Stat. 497 (1971).
32 VAT could, however, reduce property taxes even for those to whom it is refunded.
If lower property taxes resulting from VAT must be passed on by landlords in the form
of lower rents, the income tax inequity between homeowners and tenants would be re-
duced. This inequity particularly discriminates against middle-income people, since those
apartment dwellers with capital can obtain the deduction for property taxes (and also
mortgage interest) by purchasing stock in a cooperative building. Id. § 216.
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equitable system does not depend upon the need for additional revenue;
linking the two allows VAT's critics to pose the issue as one of political
realism-"a limit to the willingness of the nonpoor to give income to
the poor."83 As one salesman put it, "I don't want them to redistribute
my income."3 4
The tax program outlined during Senator McGovern's presidential
campaign attempted to dispel this reaction in two ways: first, by
choosing reform proposals which enabled him to say that no one
whose income was exclusively wages would pay one cent more in
taxes; and second, by linking reform revenues to such noncontroversial
issues as cleaner air, better education, and property tax relief.35 But
the Republican response to McGovern's call for tax reform-a pledge
not to seek a rise in taxes-indicated a belief that this reaction persists.
In describing the pledge, John Ehrlichman declined to characterize
VAT as either a tax reform or a tax increase, calling it a "substitution"
of one form of taxation for another.36
But substitution is exactly how tax reform, which means reallocat-
ing the relative burden among taxpayers, differs from the issue of
83 Herbert Stein, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, so criti-
cized Senator McGovern's early fiscal proposals. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
Those proposals included the suggestion that reform "could go a long way toward financ-
ing the Minimum Income Grant program" of $1,000 per person. G. McGovern, Tax Re-
form and Redistribution of Income, Jan. 13, 1972 (press release) (on file at the Cornell
Law Review).
34 N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1972, § 4, at 6, col. 4.
35 Id., Aug. 30, 1972, at 22, col. 4.
36 Id., Sept. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 5. Ehrlichman was even willing to back off from property
tax relief as a short-term goal, indicating that such relief might eventually be financed
without resort to additional taxes, even VAT.
President Nixon subsequently referred to "one problem" with his commitment to no
tax increase, although he limited that commitment to 1973: "There will be no Presidential
tax increase. . . . [T]here could be a Congressional tax increase. If the Congress, for
example, does not approve the $250-billion ceiling [on spending] that we have requested,
that is going to make the chances of avoiding a tax increase more difficult." Official
transcript of President Nixon's news conference, Oct. 5, 1972, reported in id., Oct. 6, 1972,
at 28, col. 4. After defeat of the spending ceiling, however, the President vetoed a water
pollution bill, stating: "As with the spending ceiling, so with this bill, a vote to sustain
the veto is a vote against a tax increase. A vote to override the veto is a vote to
increase the likelihood of higher taxes." Id., Oct. 19, 1972, at 28, col. 3. But popular direct
grants, like clean water and social security, politically outweigh the prospect of higher
taxes. Even Gerald R. Ford, the House Republican leader, voted to override the veto. Id.
Despite this pledge, on October 30, 1972, President Nixon signed into law a bill
(Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329) increasing the social security tax
rate on both employers and employees by 12.5%, or some $4.5 billion per year. This bill,
together with the 1972 expansion of the contribution base (see Act of July 1, 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-336, 86 Stat. 405) will raise the maximum social security contribution from
$468 per year in 1972 to $702 in 1974-a 50% increase. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1972, at 1,
col. 6.
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whether, owing to federal spending, the total national tax burden
should increase. A $13 billion VAT would constitute just as funda-
mental a tax reform as would redistributing an equivalent amount
through income tax amendment.8 7 The difference between the two
reforms conceals a fundamental disagreement as to who should pay. A
broader tax base would shift part of the income tax to those who enjoy
benefits such as the exclusion from income of one-half of long-term
capital gains;38 VAT would fall disproportionately on those who cannot
afford to invest in capital assets.
Unfortunately, however, the choice between the two types of
reform may be distorted into one between higher income tax and
spending on the one hand, and VAT and lower property taxes on the
other. The property tax, according to Mayor John Lindsay of New
York City, is the most hated tax, 9 yet in New Jersey, blue collar
neighborhoods opposed an income tax primarily designed to relieve
them from a property tax.40 If an equitable state income tax is resisted
even when the taxpayer visibly benefits, the linking of a broader federal
base to spending on others will provoke even greater opposition.
III
TAx AND BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES
It is more difficult to identify the beneficiaries of tax expenditures
than the recipients of direct budgetary grants. But when the specific
results of tax subsidies become apparent, public indignation will often
override generalized agreement with their objectives. For example,
there is widespread agreement that charity should be privately sup-
ported and that double taxation should be minimized. The fact that
the charitable deduction could excuse several millionaires from income
tax, however, helped lead to the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
41
37 The income and corporate reforms proposed by the Brookings Study would raise
a comparable $13.4 billion. BRoOKINGS STuDy 434. Senator McGovern's campaign proposals
suggested an increase of about $22 billion. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1972, at 22, col. 4.
38 CODE § 1202.
39 See Logan, Around City Hall, TsE N w YoRxmm, June 10, 1972, at 112.
40 N.Y. Times, June 18, 1972, § 4, at 5, col. 3.
41 The provision in question permitted individuals who had contributed large amounts
to charity for several years to deduct their charitable contributions without limit. Abuse
of the provision was not in the amount but in the form of the contribution, generally
highly appreciated securities. For example, the contribution of $100 in appreciation by a
taxpayer in the 70% bracket now costs a taxpayer $30, whereas its sale at capital gains
rates could cost him up to $35. Thus, in some instances it is cheaper to give property to
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Regardless of whether few or many people benefit from a specific
tax expenditure, deductions for some must be paid for by others.
For this reason I consistently fail to enjoy tales of my friends' ingenuity
-the broker who deducts dinner with his brother; the lawyer who
purportedly sets aside part of his living room to read cases; and the
newsman who takes depreciation on his television set. They are not
only fooling an abstraction called the government, they are fooling me.42
One explanation advanced for such behavior by people who do not
rush to tell me of the doubtful legality of their activities in other areas
is that everybody does it. This is not true. Everybody does not do it, the
majority out of conviction and others because they are not afforded the
opportunity. Furthermore, the consequence of such an assumption,
if widely acted upon, is not less taxation but more regressive taxation.43
Tax expenditures are not, therefore, just neutral economic incen-
tives; they cost as much as budgetary expenditures.
Most economists would define that $5.7 billion [in income taxes
saved owner occupants during fiscal 1971 through deduction of
mortgage interest and property taxes] as a subsidy, just as they
would the approximately $3 billion of public funds that goes to
pay rent (mostly on slum dwellings) for welfare recipients.
The tax subsidy for people with capital gains has been estimated, at
charity than to sell it; in these cases the government rather than the taxpayer is the real
donor.
The 1969 Act phased out the unlimited deduction for charitable contributions. The
more significant preference, contribution of appreciated capital assets, remained, owing
in part to pressure from universities. If named after their real contributors, many new
dorms could be called Taxpayer Hall.
France has mitigated double taxation of corporate profits by giving shareholders credit
for corporate tax paid with respect to earnings distributed as dividends. The same treat-
ment has recently been extended to American shareholders of French corporations. Yet
when, according to newspaper stories, the credit entirely offset the income tax liability of
former Premier Chaban-Delmas, he felt compelled to explain the situation on television.
See id., Feb. 3, 1972, at 14, col. 3.
42 Similarly, to the extent that high bracket taxpayers are offered disproportionate
tax benefits for investing in low-income housing or municipal bonds, it is the taxpayers
who do not so invest, and must therefore make up the lost tax revenues, that actually bear
the subsidy.
43 For example, despite its reputation as a country of tax evaders, 'France recently
imposed taxes equal to nearly 42.5% of its gross national product, as compared to about
32.9% in the United States. Moreover, 35% of the 42.5% in France was collected in the
form of sales and social security taxes; in the United States the figure was just 15.8%. As a
corollary, the United States collected nearly twice the French percentage in individual
income taxes. Calkins et al., Should the United States Adopt the Value-Added Tax?-A
Survey of the Policy Considerations and the Data Base, 26 TAx LwYEa 45, 46 (1972).
44 Breckenfeld, Housing Subsidies Are a Grand Delusion, FORTUNE, Feb. 1972, at 166.
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1972 income levels, to be about $13.7 billion, of which almost $12
billion goes to people with income of more than $25,000.
45
Pointing out that some taxpayers subsidize others does not neces-
sarily mean that the practice should cease, but it does suggest two
conclusions:
1. Recognition. If tax subsidies can be clearly recognized, they will
be subject to the same scrutiny as direct expenditures. Section 1240 of
the Internal Revenue Code was enacted and limited so as to benefit one
person, Louis B. Mayer.4 6 It would be difficult to conceive of Congress
passing a bill which made a special cash grant to Mr. Mayer. In an
attempt to equate tax subsidies and direct expenditures in the public
mind, the 1968 annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury included
a "tax expenditure budget," that is, a list of foregone tax revenues in
categories similar to those of the actual budget.47 So far, however, the
effort to increase visibility of the tax expenditure budget has been
largely restricted to law review articles. 48 The political disparity be-
tween tax and direct expenditures can be seen by comparing the
widespread criticism of Senator McGovern's proposal to increase every-
one's taxable income by $1,000 through a cash grant49 with the broad-
based public support of the 1969 proposal to exempt $1,000 of every-
one's income from tax by an increase in the personal exemption.
Interestingly, the Nixon Administration's equation of tax and
45 Pechman & Okner, Individual Income Tax Erosion by Income Tax Classes, in U.S.
CONG. JOINT ECON. Comm., THE ECONOMIcS OF FEDERAL SUBSmY PROGRAMS: A ComPENDIUam
or PA, ERs pt. 1, at 34 (1972). Treasury figures indicate that the capital gains subsidy, not
including taxing capital gains at death, is $5.6 billion, of which nearly $3 billion goes to
taxpayers with an adjusted gross income of at least $100,000. Statement of Treasury
Secretary Cohen at Hearings on Tax Subsidies and Tax Reform Before the U.S. Cong.
Joint Econ. Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in BNA DAILY ExEcUrrvE REP., No. 142,
July 21, 1972, at J-9. Senator McGovern's advisers estimated that taxing capital gains as
ordinary income at a maximum rate of 48% would raise $7 billion from individuals
annually. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1972, at 25, col. 7.
48 Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get
Enacted, 70 HARV. L. Rv. 1145, 1147 n.4 (1957).
47 US. TRAs. DEP'T, 1968 ANNUAL RjPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREAsURY 326
(1969). For example, the deduction for property taxes was classified as an expenditure for
community development and housing. Id. at 334.
48 See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 27.
In 1971 the Senate passed a bill requiring, inter alia, that the budget submitted by
the President label and estimate the expenditures made through operation of the tax
laws. That provision was deleted by a Senate-House conference committee on the ground
that it would be "more appropriate" to have the information submitted to congressional
committees. See CONF. REP. No. 558, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1971).
49 See N.Y. Times, June 18, 1972, at 2, col. 3 (remarks of H. Stein, Chairman,
President's Council of Economic Advisers).
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budgetary expenditures led not to the conclusion that tax subsidies
should be repealed, but to the conclusion that direct grants should be
terminated. John Ehrlichman linked tax reform to repeal of such
"no payout" programs as Model Cities.50 But among the least productive
programs we have are many tax subsidies. A consistent conservative
position would be to make the continuance of such expenditures depend
upon their social "payout."
2. Substitution of Direct Grants. Once it is determined that a
subsidy is desirable, the question remains as to whether it should be ef-
fected through the tax code. Tax law does not necessarily avoid bureau-
cracy. For example, the provision for rapid amortization of water pol-
lution control facilities requires certification by both the Secretary of
the Interior and the appropriate state authority.51 The installer of such
a facility could as easily receive his grant from the Secretary of the In-
terior as from the Internal Revenue Service.52 Direct subsidies have
several distinct advantages over those granted by the tax code: they are
subject to annual review, their amount can be controlled, and the same
activity is benefited equally, regardless of who does it.53 Most important,
direct grants can be considered as part of an overall legislative program.
The urban affairs committees in Congress could certainly make more
informed judgments than the tax committees as to where, how, and
if $330 million a year should be spent to subsidize rehabilitation of
low-income housing. Yet one of the more than fifty separate provisions
in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Code section 167(k), granted that sub-
sidy by permitting rapid amortization of rehabilitation expenditures.
The Senate Committee on Housing would not be considered suf-
ficiently expert in tax law to accomplish Model Cities legislation by
amending the Internal Revenue Code; thus, it is somewhat surprising
that the Senate Finance Committee, with a comparable lack of knowl-
edge as to housing needs, can enact its own Model Cities program
through a tax expenditure. 4
50 Id., May 26, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
51 CODE § 169(d), added by 85 Stat. 667 (1969).
52 See Surrey, supra note 27, at 717.
53 Under the present system a taxpayer in the 70% bracket receives a $19 benefit for
installing $100 of pollution control facilities, whereas one in the 20% bracket gets the
equivalent of $5.00.
54 See generally Surrey, supra note 27, at 715-26. The similarity also suggests that
repeal of the Model Cities program, as proposed by Ehrlichman (see note 50 and accom-





The present clamor for tax reform, like the 1969 clamor, can be
characterized by Samuel Johnson's statement that levelers want to level
down to themselves, not up. The expanded tax base proposed by
Pechman and Okner would produce more than $77 billion of addi-
tional revenue at 1972 tax rates.5 5 Nearly $58 billion of that amount,
however, comes from eliminating four items: (1) the advantages of in-
come splitting for married taxpayers; (2) the favorable treatment of
capital gains; (3) the preferences for homeowners; and (4) the non-
taxability of such "transfer payments" as social security, railroad retire-
ment benefits, and workmen's compensation.
The Pechman and Okner proposal would affect practically
everyone. More than one-half of the homeowner preferences accrue to
families in the $10,000-$25,000 income range; about forty percent of the
capital gains benefit goes to those between $15,000 and $50,000; transfer
payments are primarily made to the needy; and most taxpayers are mar-
ried. 6 But politically it is hard to explain that many of these preferences
are of greater relative benefit to upper-income groups. The carrot in
the Pechman and Okner proposal is cutting tax rates by an average of
forty-three percent.m Under their rate schedule-from seven percent
to a top marginal rate of forty-four percent-average tax payments
would decrease for all families with incomes below $25,000," and the
maximum average percentage increase in tax liability-for families with
incomes of over $1 million-would be twenty-six percent.58
In addition, certain aspects of a theoretically equitable tax base
lend themselves to political ridicule. Among the homeowner prefer-
ences included in the Pechman and Okner expanded income base is the
rental value of owner-occupied homes. If tax reform proposals are
characterized as making you pay yourself rent, the entire idea loses
credibility. As Representative Wilbur Mills remarked: "[Flew of us
are likely to be persuaded by the proposals sometimes made in academic
quarters to tax homeowners on [imputed rental value], even though it
may constitute a substantial portion of their personal income." 59 The
55 Pechman & Okner, supra note 45, at 23.
156 Id. at 22-40.
57 Id. at 29.
58 Id. at 31-32.
59 Address by Representative Wilbur Mills, Securities Industry Ass'n Management
Conference, Washington, D.C., Sept. 8, 1972.
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Pechman and Okner proposal is, of course, not intended for use as a
campaign tract; however, tax reform, like salvation in Major Barbara,
will not come until the professors of Greek learn to make gunpowder.
The procedural and political frustrations connected with broaden-
ing the tax base are illustrated by the Tax Policy Review Bill of 1972,60
introduced in May 1972 by Representative Wilbur Mills and endorsed
by the Democratic presidential campaign platform. The bill set termina-
tion dates in 1974, 1975, and 1976 for fifty-four tax preferences, eighteen
of which were to be repealed each year. Commenting on the bill, Mills
stated that many preferences were still desirable, and that threatened
expiration would force public review of the merits of all.6 ' The list
of preferences included such major items as the favorable treatment
of capital gains, deductions for nonbusiness interest and taxes, ac-
celerated depreciation, the investment credit, and ADR.
In the absence of a tax expenditure budget, it is unlikely that
Congress would have considered the Review Bill provisions in com-
parison with direct grants for the same purpose. Treasury comment on
the bill, echoing Ehrlichman, 2 did just that, stating that "this proposed
procedure should not in any way be the excuse for additional Federal
spending. Indeed, we badly need a parallel, systematic and careful
review that will end spending programs which have outlived their
usefulness or are otherwise of questionable value."63 The premise of this
statement, however, is that new direct subsidies would need more
justification than those now given by the tax code.
A more remediable defect of the Review Bill was its failure
to consider tax provisions in context. For example, the scheduled
termination dates of ADR, accelerated depreciation, and investment
credit were each in a different year. Yet each is intended as an incentive
to capital investment, and the basic question should be whether all
three are necessary.
A second error was that the first two items to be considered related
to strengthening the minimum tax. This is a ten percent tax, enacted
by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in response to disclosure of the non-
taxpaying millionaires, on the amount by which a person's "tax prefer-
ences" exceed the sum of $30,000 plus his federal taxes for the year.64
60 H.R. 15230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Review Bill].
61 N.Y. Times, June 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
62 See notes 28, 50 and accompanying text supra.
63 Treas. Dep't Release, May 31, 1972, reprinted in 1972 CCH FEn. TAX RE., No. 81,
June 7, 1972, at viii.
64 CoDE § 56, added by 83 Stat. 580 (1969), as amended, 84 Stat. 1846 (1970). The pro-
vision, as amended, allows a carryover of certain federal taxes paid in prior years.
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The three most common, tax preferences of individuals are the capital
gains deduction,' 5 qualified stock options,6 6 and accelerated deprecia-
tion.67 Each of these preferences confers a different degree of benefit.
The capital gains deduction, for example, represents a complete exclu-
sion from tax, whereas accelerated depreciation only defers taxation.
Qualified stock options are not preferences at all, if preferences are
defined as tax expenditures. Revenue loss by reason of the employee's
escaping tax is usually more than offset by disallowance of a correspond-
ing deduction to the employer.68
Owing to the disparity in benefit among included preferences, the
minimum tax is an abortion. Only the low rate and large base-that
is, permitted preferences of $30,000 plus income taxes paid-raise it to
the level of a mistake.69 Tax incentives and tax equity are antithetical;
65 One-half of long-term capital gains, such as the gain on stock held for more than
six months, is deductible and thus excluded from income. CODE §§ 1202, 1222(3). The
excluded amount is an item of tax preference.
06 The bargain element in a qualified stock option-basically an option granted to
purchase the employer's stock at a price equal to its value on the date of grant-is a
preference. For example, if an employee is granted a qualified option in 1970 to purchase
stock at $100-its then value-and exercises the option in 1972 when the stock is selling
for $120, the $20 bargain is a preference. The $20 profit is otherwise excluded from income
until the employee disposes of the stock; if he holds the stock for three years, the $20 is
taxed as long-term capital gain rather than salary. See CODE §§ 421(b), 422(a)(1). The $10 of
capital gain excluded from income is again a preference, resulting in $30 of preference
on $20 of profit. If it is not considered salary, however, the employer cannot deduct the
$20 as a business expense. Assume that both the employer and employee are in the 50%
bracket. If the option in the above example were not qualified, upon exercise the em-
ployee would include in income $20 and pay $10 of tax; the employer would deduct $20
and save $10, resulting in no net revenue to the Treasury. When the employee pays a
capital gains tax of, for example, $5 by reason of having a qualified option, the employer
does not get the deduction, and the revenue is ahead by $5. A significant motivation for
the use of qualified stock options is not tax advantage, but accounting rules. Often, classi-
fication of the $20 bargain as salary for tax purposes will parallel its accounting treat-
ment. Thus, the bargain clement in an ordinary option will, by increasing salary expense,
reduce corporate earnings. The same bargain in a qualified stock option may not, and
companies generally prefer a better earnings statement to a tax deduction.
67 The amount by which deductions for accelerated depreciation exceed those avail-
able under a straight line method is a preference item. For example, the yearly deduction
for depreciation on a machine costing $100 with a useful life of ten years would be $10.
Under one accelerated depredation method, the first deduction would be about $18. In
the first year, therefore, taxable income is $8 less than it would otherwise be, and the $8
is a preference. On the other hand, under the accelerated method the depreciation deduc-
tion in the tenth year would be only $2, or $8 less than under the straight line method.
Thus, the $8 has not been excluded from taxable income, but deferred to a later year.
Accelerated depredation on personal property, however, is a preference item only when
the property is subject to a net lease. CODE § 57(a)(3), added by 83 Stat. 581 (1969).
68 See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
69 Some of the Brookings Study suggestions include adding new preferences, raising
the rate, and eliminating the base. BRoox Nos STuDY 433.
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the justification for an economic incentive should not depend upon
whom it motivates. It may be inequitable to give people in higher
brackets a greater subsidy for installing the same amount of pollution
control expenditures.70 It is equally unfair to deny-through the mini-
mum tax-twice the subsidy for twice the investment. If the government
can forego $200 in taxes to encourage the installation of $1,000 of
pollution control facilities, the question of whether the $200 is saved
by one or one hundred people is one of politics rather than equity.
Fairness applies to the rich, too.
The minimum tax constitutes an admission that our tax expendi-
tures are out of control, and strengthening instead of repealing it should
be considered only after failure to control the preferences which it
contains. Unfortunately, the Review Bill apparently would consider
the minimum tax base before making a decision on the accelerated
depreciation and capital gains preferences.
H.R. 153607' would require review of the same fifty-four items as
the Review Bill, but without automatic termination provisions.72 Pro-
cedurally, this raises the possibility of examining similar incentives as
a group since the subsidies need not be considered in any particular
order. Politically, however, it puts inertia on the side of the subsidized;
it is easier to protest against eliminating a provision than to justify
retaining it. This can be particularly significant when-as the bill
requires-at least twenty-seven provisions will be examined each year.
Those who lose tax privileges see clearly what is happening,
whereas, absent wholesale reform and a drastic rate reduction, repeal
of any one provision may not seem of much general benefit. If the six
hundred millionaires had paid all their income tax, it would not have
appreciably lowered anyone else's. Reinforcing this legislative attitude
is the system of campaign contributions. Substantial contributors may
be liberal or conservative, on one side or the other of specific issues.
They do, however, share one common attribute-money. Although
reform of congressional campaign financing has not often been coupled
with tax reform, it is doubtful that a legislator would support tax
legislation-such as increased capital gains and estate taxes-aimed at
the very people who underwrite his campaign expenses.
Effective tax reform seems to arise not from a review of the
70 See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
7' 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The bill was introduced on June 7, 1972, by Representa-
tive Ullman of Oregon.
72 Primarily because of this difference, Representative Wilbur Mills called the bill
"preferable" to his own measure. Address, supra note 59.
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inequities of present law, but rather in response to a specific tax policy
theme put forth by politicians. In 1969 it was the millionaires. As a
presidential candidate, Senator McGovern's theme was "[m]oney made
by money should be taxed at the same rate as money made by men.""
3
He therefore proposed that capital gains be taxed as ordinary income
(with a maximum tax rate of forty-eight percent), and that tax benefits
for ownership interests in oil and gas, real estate, machinery and equip-
ment, municipal bonds, overseas facilities, and export-related property
be eliminated or reduced. Interestingly, the provisions he attacked can
be defended as investment incentives. He refrained from criticizing
most of those which cannot, such as the deduction for nonbusiness
taxes or for charitable contributions of appreciated property. Although
the latter do not discriminate against wage earners, their omission more
probably resulted from the judgment of McGovern's advisers that, as
Paul A. Samuelson commented,
[T]rying to dose all loopholes-including .. .deductibility of
interest on home mortgages . . . represents political suicide. You
just cannot explain to people convincingly, even though it is true,
that they will be better off if we are able to lower tax rates by
dosing up all such loopholes.74
Business incentives, unlike personal deductions, can be defended in
terms of their benefit to the economy, and limiting reform proposals to
those provisions makes the issue one of need for the subsidy rather than
whether it belongs in the tax code. Moreover, if tax reform does not
bring lower rates, the most appeal it can offer is not to hurt the tax-
payer.7 5
V
DETERMINING WHO SHOULD PAY
Tax reform and additional federal spending should be indepen-
dent issues,76 particularly when such spending is associated with assis-
tance to the welfare poor. A broader tax base affects relative burdens
only among taxpayers, that is, those with income above the poverty
73 N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1972, at 22, col. 2.
74 Id., Sept. 8, 1972, at 33, col. 2.
75 McGovern's proposals would only benefit (by an estimated $1.4 billion) persons
with ordinary investment income now taxed at marginal rates of more than 48%.
78 The tax expenditure concept is a way to evaluate existing spending programs
rather than to suggest programs for which new taxes need be raised.
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line.77 VAT is intended to assure that new taxes will be borne by
consumers in general rather than by investors; such changes as higher
capital gains rates, termination of the investment credit, and repeal
of ADR assume that investors do not bear enough of the present burden.
Politically, both sides overstate their case. The VAT rebate does
not completely cure the problem of regressiveness; however, many
economists believe that to some degree corporate taxes, as well as VAT,
are passed on to consumers through higher prices. The Treasury
estimates that if only one-fourth of the 1971 corporate tax collection
was passed on to consumers, persons with incomes of less than $15,000
would bear-both as consumers and shareholders-more than forty
percent.
78
Any determination as to who should pay additional taxes should
start by excluding unrealistic possibilities. The decision will not be
made with reference to direct spending programs, despite the attempt to
popularize the tax expenditure budget. Next, the employee portion of
social security benefits will continue to be financed largely by a payroll
tax. Moreover, even a reform-minded Congress is not likely to consider
that equity or politics compels ending the income-splitting preference
for married taxpayers, taxing homeowners on the imputed rental value
of their homes, or treating social security benefits as income.
The question of tax reform thus becomes one of asking, within the
above limits, whether capital, that is, people with capital, bear too little
or too much of the present tax burden. The answer should take into
account all major taxes-corporate and individual income, payroll,
and estate and gift-not just income, as in the Review Bill.79 If people
with capital are bearing too much, then VAT is the best way to raise
additional revenue; if these people are bearing too little, then the
balance should be redressed through income and estate taxes.80
77 But see Dodyk, The Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Poor, 71 COLum. L. REv.
758, 786-87 (1971).
78 See Statement of Treasury Secretary Cohen, supra note 45, at J-15 (Appendix F).
The Appendix sets forth five different calculations of the amount of corporate tax borne
by individuals of different income classes, depending on how much is shifted forward
to consumers. The more tax shifted forward, the more borne by low- and middle-income
people.
79 Cf. notes 60-63 and accompanying text supra.
80 It is interesting to compare the unexpressed balancing of earnings and capital
under proposed income tax reforms. The Brookings Study would repeal the 50% maxi-
mum on earned income, while keeping ADR and the investment credit. BRooraNoS STuDY
432. The Review Bill would re-examine the latter two, but not the maximum tax. A pro-
posed Tax Reform Act, introduced in March 1972 by Senators Hart, Kennedy, Mondale,





According to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Frederick Hick-






Social security (employer pays one-half
and can deduct it from income tax) 63.7
Estate and gift 4.3
The employee portion of social security, even before the recent in-
creases,82 amounts to about one-fourth of all taxes imposed on individ-
ual incomes.83 The other three-fourths favors income from capital
over income from services in several ways: investment credit, accel-
erated depreciation, ADR, capital gains preferences, and exclusions
for interest on life insurance proceeds as well as for the first $100 of
dividend income. On the other hand, the maximum rate for earned
income is fifty percent, 4 as against seventy percent for other income; 5
however, this generally benefits only taxpayers with annual earnings
of more than $52,000.
Using the tax collection figures, Secretary Hickman rebuts the idea
that capital is unduly favored (and that we therefore need changes of
the sort proposed by Pechman and Okner, and later in a modified form
by McGovern) with three main statistical arguments.8 "
First, without the legislation passed during the Nixon Administra-
tion, tax collections from individuals would be significantly higher.
The greatest percentage reduction in tax, owing to the low-income
allowance, has accrued to people with less than $3,000 of income.
Secretary Cohen testified that changes in the tax law since January 1,
81 Lecture on "'Loopholes' and the Tax Base," by Frederick Hickman, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury, before the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, in New
York City, May 1, 1972. Figures for excise tax collections are omitted. This table fails
to take into account the increased collections resulting from the two recent increases
in the social security tax.
82 See note 36 supra.
83 Individual income and employee social security collections total $120 billion, of
which $30 billion is attributable to employee social security payments.
84 CODE § 1348.
85 CODE § 1.
86 See Hickman, supra note 81.
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1969, would, for the years 1969-1972, increase corporate taxes by $4.9
billion, decrease individual income taxes by $18.9 billion, and decrease
excise taxes on cars and telephones-mostly benefiting individuals-by
$3.5 billion.8 7
Second, most of the preferences cited by Pechman and Okner-
notably, transfer payments such as social security-accrue to low-income
taxpayers.
Third, since 1952 the effective income tax rate on individuals has
remained constant at about ten percent, and the effective corporate tax
rate, after allowance for investment credit and percentage depletion, is
greater than in 1965.88 Moreover, the effective federal income tax rate
on individuals is progressive. Those with incomes of between $10,000
and $15,000 pay nineteen percent; on incomes above $50,000, the
effective rate is nearly forty percent.
Hickman's first point is correct. Several significant provisions of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, including increases in the personal
exemption,89 the standard deduction, and the low-income allowance,
primarily benefited low-income taxpayers. On the other hand, the low-
income allowance was predicated on a need for about $1.50 a day to
cover all nonfood expenses (at 1966 prices); 90 the Reform Act of 1969
reduced the average tax burden on the poor-combined federal, state,
and local-from twenty-eight percent of income to twenty-six per-
cent.91 Increases in the other deductions did not entirely offset the
amount by which inflation had previously reduced their value. A family
of four in 1948 would shelter proportionately more of its income with
$2,400 of personal exemptions than one with the same purchasing power
in 1972, with $3,000 of personal exemptions.
92
87 Statement of Treasury Secretary Cohen, supra note 45, at J-2.
88 Id. The figures, however, exclude ADR, which was enacted in 1971.
89 The argument that personal exemptions should be abolished because they are
worth more to high-income taxpayers, although frequently advanced, is not wholly per-
suasive. Admittedly, a $750 exemption is worth more to a taxpayer in the 60% bracket
than to one whose marginal rate is 20%. Most of the revenue, however, benefits low-income
taxpayers. To a man earning $100,000 an extra $150 in deductions is not especially sig-
nificant, and although any deduction mitigates progressivity, the progressive rates are not
God-given. Reduction of marginal rates from 60% to 58% and from 20% to 19% through
the use of personal exemptions might reach the right relative progression anyway.
90 Orshansky, Who Was Poor in 1966, in CHiLDREN's ALLowANcsS AND THE ECONOMIC
WELFAR OF CILDREN 20-21 (E. Burns ed. 1968).
91 Dodyk, supra note 77, at 800.
92 Hickman points out that without all the tax changes since 1962, which include rate
reductions in all brackets, the effective tax on all individuals would have risen from 10.6%




As for the second point, although many preferences may exclude
a greater amount from the tax base at the lower end of the income
scale, the revenue foregone benefits those at the top. For example, the
nontaxability of social security payments is justified on the ground
that such payments are to the needy. But it is estimated that forty per-
cent of the payments benefits people who would not otherwise be in
want.93 Including payments to the poor in the income base does not
mean that they would be taxed, in view of deductions such as the
low-income allowance or, possibly, a system of tax credits. Okner
stresses that, accepting Hickman's limitation of realistic "loopholes" in
the tax base as $4.9 billion, nearly one-half the tax saved by those pro-
visions goes to those with incomes over $100,000-about three-tenths of
one percent of the population.9 4
The final set of statistics is somewhat misleading. First, the figures
as to effective tax rates in various income brackets are apparently based
on adjusted gross income, which is calculated only after such preferences
as capital gains, percentage depletion, and accelerated depreciation on
rental property.95 Thus, if a taxpayer had $1 million of long-term capital
gain, he would be allowed to deduct $500,000 in computing adjusted
gross income. With no other income or deductions, his tax would be
about $320,000. This would be an effective rate of thirty-two percent
if based on his actual income, but sixty-four percent of adjusted gross.
More basic, however, the appeal to average rates misses the entire
point of tax reform. If two wage earners each have $10,000 of income,
but one pays no tax and the other pays $6,000, their combined average
rate is thirty percent. The premise, however, is that, absent a strong
justification, people with equal income should pay equally.96
The numbers cited by Hickman certainly do not demonstrate any
bias in our present tax structure against people with capital. Under
an income tax the ultimate competing interests, as recognized by
McGovern's tax slogan, 7 are earnings and income from capital. The
Nixon Administration has recently favored the latter through ADR,
increased payroll taxes, and reenactment of the investment credit. ADR
was originally adopted by the Treasury as an interpretation of existing
93 See generally C. GREEN, NEGATME TAXES AND THE PovERTY PROBLEm 14-33 (1967).
94 Letter from B. Okner to the N.Y. Times, May 8, 1972, at 36, col. 4.
95 CODE § 62.
06 As it was put by a Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation, recommending against
favorable treatment of capital gains, "a buck is a buck is a buck." Quoted in E. BENSoN,
PROPOSALS FoR TAX REFOR? 86 (1969).
97 See text accompanying note 73 supra.
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law. 8 This was criticized as the reenactment, by administrative action,
of the legislatively repealed investment credit.0 9 When in 1971 Congress
both reinstated the investment credit and legislatively approved ADR,
it in effect afforded a double investment credit. On the other hand, the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 increased the maximum capital gains tax rate
from twenty-five to thirty-six and one-half percent, and lowered the
highest rate on earned income from seventy to fifty percent.100 By those
measures, plus a temporary suspension of the investment credit and
increased deductions for low-income taxpayers (whose income is mostly
earnings), the Nixon Administration has not significantly changed the
existing balance. In this sense, Hickman's argument represents a sound
statement of the conservative position: after all the recent tinkering,
nothing fundamental has changed. But that argument cuts both ways.
If the tax burden has been falling unfairly for years, then even more
fundamental change is called for.
We live in a country in which the richest one percent of the popula-
tion owns between twenty and thirty percent of individually-owned
capital, 0 1 and in which tax subsidies generally favor such capital. In-
come from stock market gains is more valued by our tax laws than the
same amount of income from writing a book, flying a plane, or curing
disease. We live in a country which finances a large part of its old age
benefits by a regressive tax only on earnings, because people like mem-
bers of the President's Task Force find that $30 billion contribution to
be of "symbolic" significance. 0 2 It is therefore difficult to make a per-
suasive case that tax reform should radically increase the advantage of
income from capital over earnings, and of those taxpayers with capital
over those without it.
VII
TOWARDS A MoPiE RYALisTic PROGRAM
In order to achieve a broader income base while tax reform is a
popular issue, the following steps are suggested:
1. Bookkeeping. Tax equity should be divorced from the question
98 See Bittker, Treasury Authority To Issue the Proposed "Asset Depreciation Range
System" Regulations, 49 TAxEs 265, 272 (1971).
99 See id. at 268.
100 CODE §§ 1201, 1348.
101 Study by L. Upton and N. Lyons of the Cambridge Institute, cited in Wicker,
The Rich Get Richer, etc., N.Y. Times, June 29, 1972, at 39, col. 1.
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of whether funds should be given to nontaxpayers. Regardless of
whether such benefits are in the form of direct grants or a negative
income tax, many people are repelled by the entire concept. The pur-
pose of a broader tax base should be clearly associated with reducing the
income tax of people who do not get special tax subsidies. The Nixon
Administration originally suggested VAT as a device to help property
taxpayers. Relief from income tax should elicit even more support.
Although the reallocation aspect would be highlighted if the initial
proposals failed to result in greater total tax collections, that does not
seem practicable at present unless, as Ehrlichman suggested, an income
tax rise is not necessary. In that event 1973 would be an ideal year for
income tax reform, and the Nixon Administration could support it
without fear of an increased deficit.
The Brookings Study, however, has estimated that under present
programs there will be a $17 billion annual budget deficit at full em-
ployment by 1974-1975, in the absence of tax increases, 103 and Paul
Samuelson predicted that regardless of who won the election, Congress
would legislate higher taxes in 1973.104 Based partly on such testimony,
the Joint Economic Committee concluded that "[t]he pretense that
additional revenues will not be needed should be abandoned in favor
of a constructive discussion of how these revenues can be obtained."'10 5
In that event, the best that can be done is to pose the reform question
in terms of income tax rates or the income tax base. But tax reform
would inspire more support if at some future date it could be shown
to lower taxes rather than simply not to increase them, or to increase
them less than otherwise.
2. Rates. Any proposal should therefore contain a specific lower
rate schedule, even if promises of cuts in the lower brackets are largely
tokens of intention. As McGovern proposed, the maximum rate should
be lowered from its present seventy percent to about fifty percent for
three reasons. First, too high a rate distorts economic decisions, favoring
investments which produce little current income and providing greater
incentive for tax shelters. Second, without a capital gains preference
103 BROOKINGS Srnm 418-19. This forecast was based on the assumption of a 5%
social security increase, rather than the more than 20% increase signed into law. The
Brookings team now predicts a $20-$25 billion budget deficit at full employment in
fiscal year 1975. See Rivlin, Dear Voter Your Taxes Are Going Up (No Matter Who Wins
on Tuesday), N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1972, § 6, at 35.
104 Statement by P. Samuelson, Professor, MIT, at Hearings of the Joint Econ.
Comm. on the Midyear Review of the Economy, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in BNA
DAILY Exacurivp REP., No. 146, July 27, 1972, at J-5.
105 JonT EcoN. CoM., THE 1972 MwIYEAR Ravimw oF Ta ECONOMY, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 16 (1972).
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sixty to seventy percent rates would be unrealistic. Such rates would
prevent the newer and more dynamic capital accumulations more than
they would affect those already in existence. Estate and gift taxation is
both a more effective and a more appropriate method of reducing the
unequal distribution of wealth, since people who have not made the
money are generally thought to be less deserving. Third, the entire re-
form proposal loses much of its soak-the-rich aura. Psychologically, com-
plaints of an increased burden are less persuasive when the maximum
rate has been lowered, and the few who now pay sixty to seventy percent
on a substantial portion of their income may support the changes.
Practically, a soak-the-rich program is not feasible. President Kennedy
was unable to get Congress to enact a tax on unrealized capital gains at
death even when such a tax would be accompanied by a lowering of the
capital gains rate from twenty-five to twenty-one percent. 10 6 Any pro-
gram that suggests both taxation in full and also at death should reduce
the maximum capital gains rate to not more than the present maximum
rate on earned income. We are far from reordering our priorities to
favor earnings over investment.
3. Social Security. The social security system could be made more
progressive by allowing a credit against income tax for up to twenty-five
or fifty dollars of payroll tax. This large and highly visible subsidy to
earnings, while not offsetting even the recent increase in social security
tax, would fund at least a fraction of benefits through the general income
tax system without attacking the trust fund concept. 10 7
4. Capital Gains. The full amount of capital gain, whether short-
term or long-term, should be included in income. Gain should be con-
sidered realized upon disposition of property by gift or bequest. Upon
such a disposition, however, gain should be limited to the increase in
value after the legislation is passed, and residences and certain house-
hold property should be excepted.
5. State Taxes. Except as a business expense, state taxes should not
be deductible. In order to encourage state and local income taxes in
lieu of property and sales taxes, there could be a credit against federal
income taxes for up to twenty percent of such taxes. This would make
those taxes truly progressive, since the amount of federal benefit would
no longer depend upon one's tax bracket. To give the states time to
conform, the change could be made gradually. Since the standard
106 See Hearings on HR. 8363 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 49 (1963).
107 Senator McGovern's economic program included a proposal that some new social




deduction is intended to be in lieu of several itemized deductions, in-
cluding state taxes, it might be decreased.
6. ADR and Investment Credit. ADR should be repealed, and the
investment credit should be used only to stimulate investment during
slack periods.
7. Charitable Contributions. Deductions for charitable contribu-
tions should not exceed the cost of the contributed property.
8. Minimum Tax on Preferences. This provision should be re-
pealed.
9. Tax Expenditure Budget. The reform proposal should repro-
pose the bill passed by the Senate in 1971. One impetus to reform is to
show taxpayers the benefits they are not getting; direct grants may then
be evaluated by Congress with reference to tax subsidies, and vice
versa.108
10. Congressional Campaign Financing. A Congressional Election
Campaign Fund, similar to that established last year for post-1972
presidential campaigns, 10 should be established. Such a fund, by allow-
ing people to designate one dollar of their income tax liability for use by
a candidate, decreases his reliance on large contributors.
The above program is limited to ten proposals; as Clemenceau said
of the Fourteen Points, God needed only ten. Omitted are several
questionable tax subsidies, such as those to the real estate industry, to
the oil and gas industry, and to exporters, all of which the McGovern
program focused on. But the changes are in preferences which apply
most widely. If the man with $1,000 of state income tax can be made to
see that ending that particular deduction will help him, then meaning-
ful tax reform will be possible. Moreover, repealing preferences which
benefit many taxpayers will put increased pressure on those which help
a limited few. Despite Samuelson's claim that this would be "political
suicide," which it could be if announced in conjunction with an ex-
panded poverty program, a poll ordered by the commission studying
VAT indicated that forty percent of those questioned preferred a
broader tax base as a way of substantially raising federal taxes, even if
that included cutting deductions for charities and local taxes.110
108 A President might not want authority to cut spending in excess of a spedfied
ceiling, as President Nixon did, if the political choice was one between direct grants to
the poor and such tax preferences as the oil depletion allowance.
109 Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. VIII, § 801, 85 Stat. 563.
110 N.Y. Times, May 21, 1972, § 1, at 34, col. 3. Of those polled, 34% favored VAT,




The suggestions advanced here are incomplete in two respects:
they do not include estate and gift taxation, nor are they intended to
provide revenues to finance new spending programs. Estate and gift
taxation has historically been more of a leveling than a revenue-raising
measure, since the preferences involved are not generally defensible as
incentives. The question is therefore its technical effectiveness rather
than the more controversial issue of economic priorities. Moreover, the
full effect of estate tax changes takes place over at least a generation.
Accordingly, although these provisions should be substantially strength-
ened, specific recommendations should probably await a Treasury study.
The possibilities with regard to financing new social programs
include termination of additional income tax preferences, reenactment
of various repealed excise taxes,"' diversion of the alcohol tax from-
or terminating-the highway trust fund, some increased estate and gift
revenues, temporary surcharges, increases in corporate tax rates, and
even VAT. In the Scandinavian countries broad social benefit programs,
coupled with adjustments to the personal income tax, are felt to "more
than offset" any element of regressivity of VAT of more than fifteen
percent." 2 Assuming progressive income and estate taxes, and increased
public spending, it might then be reasonable to favor capital. But not
now. What you don't see does hurt you.
111 The Brookings Study ruled out estate and gift taxes, excise taxes (on the grounds
of regressiveness and political opposition), and increased payroll taxes as possible addi-
tional sources of federal revenue. BRoox wNs STUDY 428.
112 Cohen, Treasury Says European Experience with Value Added Tax Is Favorable,
35 J. TAxATION 316, 316-17 (1971).
